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MEDICAL ERRORS: CAUSES, CURES, AND CAPITALISM
KEITH MYERS, M.D., J.D.1
He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.
-Benjamin Franklin
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I. INTRODUCTION
Expenditures for healthcare consumed over thirteen percent of the United States
gross domestic product in 1998, totaling over $1.1 trillion dollars.2 A recent Institute
of Medicine (IOM) report estimated that the number of deaths attributable to medical

1
Dr. Myers is a board certified internist who practices emergency medicine full time. He
was a member of the University of Florida Law Review and a 2001 graduate. He is a member
of the Florida Bar and operates LexMed, a medicolegal consulting service. Dr. Myers would
like to dedicate this article to his family: Drue, Devon, and Dane. E-mail contact:
keithm@gator.net.
2

See, Healthcare Costs Grow in Relation to U.S. Economy, HCFA Report Shows, MED.
INDUSTRY TODAY, Jan. 12, 2000, § Providers (citing Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) data, (which reported a 5.6 percent rise in healthcare costs for 1998, matching overall
U.S. economic growth).
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errors in the U.S. was as high as 98,000.3 This number represented hospital deaths
only.4 Undoubtedly, additional deaths and injuries occurred in the outpatient
setting.5 Whether the IOM estimate was exaggerated or not, the larger issue is
whether the overall healthcare industry is operating at an acceptable error rate.6 If
the error rate is unacceptably high, then what should it be?7 Are there legal
impediments to detecting, reporting, analyzing, and improving error rates?8
This article explores the causes of medical error, the medical profession’s
responses to errors, and how the legal system responds to medical error through
litigation and legislation. Part II discusses the definition of “medical error,” the
frequency and pervasiveness of the problem, and the causes at the individual and
system level. Part III considers how the culture of medicine has largely failed to
address medical errors as a systems-based problem, and how the legal culture
discourages admitting errors due to the threat of litigation. Focusing on systems,
data must be collected and analyzed, and legal guidelines developed to encourage
error reporting and develop standards, preferably at the state level. Part IV examines
how both the legal and medical cultures might be reformed in order to reduce the rate
of medical error, which would promote the ultimate goal of better quality healthcare.
Legal barriers against error reporting need to be removed and liability theories reevaluated, with appropriate legislation to foster these changes. Part V discusses the
role of economic incentives which promoted the current state of affairs, and how
these forces might effectively be employed to shape medical, legal, and legislative
responses to medical error. It is clear that if medical error rates are unacceptably
high, new approaches by doctors, lawyers, patients, and legislators are needed.
II. ERROR CLASSIFICATION
A. What is Medical Error?
A Jehovah’s witness is given a blood products infusion to reduce her risk of
bleeding.9 A seven-year-old-boy dies after receiving the wrong medication from an

3

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
31 (Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
4

See id.

5

See e.g., Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36
INQUIRY 255 (1999) (describing costs of adverse events, including outpatients).
6
See Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in
Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000); Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine
Medical Errors Figures are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000).
7
See e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System — The Movement for
Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 488, 490-92 (1999)(suggesting “six
sigma” quality goal, an error tolerance level of less than 3.4 errors per million events).
8

See Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error: A
Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physician, and Attorney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541,
549-57 (2000) [hereinafter Liang, Promoting Patient Safety].
9

See Gregory S. Loeben, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? A Case of Medical Mistake, 2
MED. CROSSFIRE 80 (2000).
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unlabelled cup on an operating room tray.10 In the first case, the patient is unharmed
and unaware that her caregivers have violated her religion-based treatment refusal.11
In the second case, a child is dead, and a family is devastated.12 Are these medical
errors? It seems intuitively clear that the second case is, but what about the first?
The term “error” suggests an unintentional act or omission.13 By logical
extension, the term “medical error” suggests an unintentional act that is related to the
practice of medicine.14 Patient death or injury is thus not required to meet this
definition. Rather, it is sufficient that patient safety is inadvertently threatened,
whether actual or potential, or that a patient’s refusal for service is not obeyed.15
Note that patient errors might also be included in this definition if, for example, a
patient commits a mistake with medication that proper education could have
prevented.16
Excluded from this definition of medical error are willful, reckless, and
intentional acts or omissions, because these are outside the scope of “inadvertent.”17
Even though a reckless act or omission may be unintentional, it falls so far outside of
the realm of a reasonable standard of due care that it is not mere negligence.18
Rather, recklessness implies an indifference equivalent to willful behavior.19
Examples of such recklessness might include a surgeon who operates while
intoxicated, or a doctor who treats a condition for which he is not trained despite the
availability of referral for more appropriate care.20 Res ipsa loquitor, however, is a
policy-based legal doctrine which creates an inference of negligence (in many
jurisdictions), and is reasonably viewed as within the definition of medical error.21

10
See Rebecca Voelker, “Treat Systems Not Errors,” Experts Say, 276 JAMA 1537, 1538
(1996).
11

See Loeben, supra note 9, at 80.

12

See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38.

13
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 771 (1971) defines error as:
1a: an act or condition of often ignorant or imprudent deviation from a code or
behavior… b: …an unintentional deviation from truth or accuracy… c: an act that
through ignorance, deficiency, or accident departs from or fails to achieve what should
be done… 3: something produced by mistake… 6: a deficiency or imperfection in
structure or function: DEFECT.
14

See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 542.

15

See id.

16

See id

17

See id

18

See id. Conduct on this level also includes intentional torts such as battery, and criminal
acts. Liang, supra note 8.
19

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990).

20

See e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (finding physician
negligent for performing operation he was not trained to do).
21

See e.g., Ybarra v. Spagnard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (allowing an inference of
negligence).
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B. The Scope of the Problem
A recent report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) estimated that between 44,000
and 98,000 patients die each year in the U.S. from medical errors.22 The IOM
arrived at this number by extrapolation from previous studies in New York, Utah and
Colorado.23 Other prior studies also showed a substantial risk of death from medical
error.24
The IOM report has been criticized for its methodological flaws, and for possibly
overestimating the actual number of deaths caused by medical error.25 Alternatively,
the IOM report has been criticized for study design flaws that may have resulted in
an underestimate of deaths.26 Of note is that the IOM report’s number of deaths
estimate was derived solely from data on hospitalized patients.27 Certainly,
outpatients also die from medical error, though the number of deaths is uncertain.28
Adverse events and outcomes occur in the absence of medical error, and it may
be important to make methodological or semantic distinctions between adverse
events and medical errors.29 Regardless of these technical concerns and of the
criticism of the IOM report, medical errors do occur at some rate. The major
premise of this discussion is that this rate is too high.30 Further, there is a subgroup
of errors causing patient harm which is preventable.31 For example, in the Utah and
Colorado study the cost of preventable adverse events was nearly half of the total

22

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 31.

23

See id. at 30-31 (citing Troyen A Brennan et. al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324
ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991), and Eric J. Thomas et al., Cost of Medical Injuries in Utah and
Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255 (1999)).
24
See e.g., David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277
JAMA 301 (1997)(finding that adverse drug events caused an almost two-fold increased risk
of death); David P. Phillips et al., Increase in U.S. Medication-Error Deaths Between 1983
and 1993, 351 LANCET 643 (1998) (finding 2.57-fold increase in medication deaths).
25
See e.g., Troyan A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors—
Could it Do Harm?, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1123 (2000)(arguing that hospital care is actually
becoming safer, distinguishing terms adverse event and error, and criticizing IOM
methodology); Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in
Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000) (criticizing IOM methodology).
26

See Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Figures are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95
(2000) (arguing that IOM report may have underestimated number of deaths).
27

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 29-31.

28

See supra note 23. Comprehensive estimates for overall outpatient deaths due to
medical error are not available. Medication error seems to be the most studied outpatient
medical error.
29

See Brennan, supra note 25, at 1123-25.

30

See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 488 (1999) (discussing healthcare quality, comparison
with other industries, and organizations for monitoring quality).
31

See id. at 488-89.
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costs attributable to adverse events.32 The physician’s credo primum non nocerum
(“first do no harm”), thus suggests that it is incumbent upon medical doctors to lead
the effort to reduce medical errors.33
C. Errors Occur at the Level of the Individual
If medical error creates potential harm to a patient, when does it occur during the
delivery of healthcare? The answer is that it can occur at any stage of medical care.34
Despite the complexity of healthcare as a “system,” actual delivery of care operates
at the individual level.35 Thus, the common denominator for all healthcare is a oneon-one interaction between a provider and a patient.36 It is this interpersonal
dynamic which exposes or creates error potential at various stages, such as
examination, testing, diagnostic theorizing, or treatment, to name a few.37 Since
healthcare is delivered at the human level, medical errors are ultimately attributable
to a person and not to an institution or system.38 This fact does not mean that legal
liability for errors rests solely at the individual level, for clearly organizations and
hospitals may be found liable for medical errors.39
If the endpoint or baseline source for all medical error is at the provider-patient
level, then what can be done about it? Both sides of the care delivery equation,
patients and providers, want to reduce medical error rates to the lowest feasible
level.40 A reduction in medical error rates would be cost-effective through more
efficient resource allocation, and the quality of care would improve.41 However,
there are undoubtedly members of the plaintiff bar who fear economic harm if
medical error rates are substantially reduced.42 This latter group has an incentive to
maintain the status quo, or to allow error rates to increase, in order to flourish.43
Therefore, it is not so straightforward to claim that reducing errors is a universal
goal.
32

See id.

33

See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 563.

34

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 35-36.

35

See CHARLES VINCENT & BAS DE MOL, SAFETY IN MEDICINE 233 (2000).

36

See id.

37

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 35-36. Author’s note: A “computer error” might be
blamed for a medical mistake by an automatic dose delivery machine. Even here, though,
error would likely be traceable to the human who designed, built, or programmed the machine,
or entered incorrect patient data.
38

See Liang, supra note 8, at 542.

39

See e.g., Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 730 N.E. 2d 278 (Ill. 2000) (holding
HMO potentially liable for doctor’s negligence because HMO assigned excessive number of
patients to the doctor).
40

See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490-92.

41

See id.

42

See Jeffrey Ghannam, Goal to Reduce Medical Errors is Fraught With Difficulties, 86
A.B.A. J. 88 (2000).
43

See id.
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D. System Errors
Although errors are committed by individuals and affect only one patient at a
time, the provider-patient interaction does not occur in a vacuum.44 This interaction
is influenced by the environment, an external force which increases or decreases the
chance for inevitable human error.45 This outside force, in the context of a medical
errors discussion, is labeled a system.46 A system may be defined as, “a complex
unity formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a
common purpose.”47 Alternatively, a system is defined as “an organized or
established procedure or method or the set of materials or appliances used to carry it
out.”48
A healthcare system may thus be viewed as an environmental force which is
complex, establishes procedures and methods, and serves a common purpose.
Because this force exerts an influence on the patient-provider encounter, it is
necessary to examine whether the healthcare system promotes or can prevent
medical errors.49 One caveat is required: Systems exist in many forms and sizes.50
In the medical context, for example, a system may be a single doctor’s office, an
operating room, or a large network of hospitals.51
Regardless of the size or complexity of a system, research has consistently shown
human error can be accounted for, measured, and reduced through proper
organization and methodology.52 Medical systems are often compared with other
industries, particularly aviation and nuclear energy.53 Research shows systems in
these other industries, through proper design and monitoring, share the potential to
reduce the likelihood of mishap caused by human error.54 For example, aircraft

44

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 49-52.

45

See id. See also Robert E. Anderson et al., The Sensitivity and Specificity of Clinical
Diagnostics During Five Decades: Toward an Understanding of Necessary Fallibility, 261
JAMA 1610, 1614 (1989).
46

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 52.

47

See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 2322.

48

See id.

49

See VINCENT & DE MOL, supra note 35, at 66-67. See also Liang, Promoting Patient
Safety, supra note 8, at 544-45; and, Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851,
1853 (1994).
50

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 52.

51

See id. For example, the Veterans Administration’s entire network of hospitals can be
viewed as a single system. Within this larger system are smaller systems at the hospital and
sub-hospital levels.
52

See Leape, supra note 49, at 1854. See also Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note
8, at 544-45; Lucian L. Leape, Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical Error, 280
JAMA 1444, 1445 (1998) [hereinafter Preventing Medical Error].
53

See Leape, supra note 49, at 1854. See also Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note
8, at 544-45.
54

See Leape, Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1444-45.
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manufacturers assume human error will occur, so the planes are designed with
automatic and redundant features that effectively buffer or absorb pilot error.55
Individual and system errors may be distinguished by labeling them as “active”
and “latent,” respectively.56 Active errors occur at the individual operator level, and
usually have more immediate effects.57 Latent errors are system-based potential
errors: Potential meaning that they trigger or promote error.58 Latent errors are
removed from individual control, and because they are unrecognized in a complex
system, pose a greater threat to safety.59 A latent error in a complex system can
promote multiple active errors before someone recognizes the system’s flaw.60
Unfortunately, for the patient who is injured or killed prior to that moment of flaw
recognition, any system fixes come too late.
III. MEDICAL AND LEGAL INFLUENCES
A. Pathology of the Medical Culture
Physicians are taught to be compulsive and to attend to detail, which is an
inarguably desirable feature of their training.61 They are also taught that mistakes are
caused by individual failure.62 My personal experience as a medical student and
internal medicine resident was entirely consistent with these observations.63 The
medical culture persists in propagating the myth that the appropriate standard of
medical care is error free.64 Any failure to uphold this standard is viewed as an
individual failure, and the doctor alone is viewed as culpable.65
Rather than admit that perfection is an unrealistic standard, medical training and
practice persist in demanding error free practice.66 This fosters what one
commentator labels the “shame and blame” mentality of the medical culture toward
medical error.67 Physicians are taught to feel shame for any mistake, and to accept

55

See Leape, supra note 49, at 1855.

56

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 55-56.

57

See id.

58

See David W. Bates & Atul A. Gawande, Error in Medicine: What Have We Learned?,
132 ANN. INT. MED. 763 (2000).
59

See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 55-56.

60

See id.

61

See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 545.

62

See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763.

63

M.D., University of Miami, 1987; residency, University of Hawaii, 1987-1990; Board
Certified, Internal Medicine, 1990.
64

See Leape, supra note 49, at 1852.

65

See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763.

66

See Leape, supra note 49, at 1852.

67

See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 545.
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the entire blame.68 In some instances this approach may be entirely appropriate.
Some who attend medical school or enter residency training are simply not up to the
job. Others, upon clearing the hurdles of training, commit overt malpractice and
deserve to be blamed and punished. However, unyielding reliance on the reactive
shame and blame approach, rather than attempting some degree of a proactive
systems based approach, has been criticized for failing to adequately self-regulate the
medical profession69 or reduce error rates.70 Further, the reactive approach probably
has little or no effect on latent errors, because these are not consistently admitted or
reported.71
In clinical terms, the medical culture’s traditional focus on individual culpability
for error is pathological in the sense that such a mentality flatly ignores a reality that
doctors are themselves clearly aware of: Humans make mistakes, and this includes
doctors! If a patient so adamantly denied this reality despite objective evidence to
the contrary, his doctor would diagnose him as having insane delusions. Also, the
provider’s fear of blame and guilt for errors provides a disincentive to be forthright.72
The fear of being sued is a major deterrent to admitting or reporting errors.73 Loss of
hospital privileges or insurance contracts, or sanctioning by medical boards provide
additional disincentives to admit error.74 Thus, while no physician can objectively
deny that errors happen to them or their colleagues, the culture of medicine exists in
a state of suspended disbelief.75
Although personal accountability is a desirable norm for any professional, the
medical culture has traditionally overemphasized individual culpability at the
expense of failure to truly explore the alternative explanations or mechanisms which
promote error.76 Not until fairly recently has the medical culture realized that
systems play a substantial, if not preeminent, role in promoting medical errors.77
This is a step in the right direction. The sad irony of the traditional approach is that
it ignores fundamental medical diagnostics and treatment philosophy. Diseases are
the underlying cause of symptoms, so find and fix the former to cure the latter. How
many more patients must die due to faulty systems before the primum non nocerum
clause is triggered?
68

See id.

69

See Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians’ Duty to Disclose
Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 58-59 (1980).
70

See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38.

71

See id.

72
See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example From
Medical Practice, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1467 (2000); see id.; Leape, supra note 49, at
1852; Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537.
73
See Jeffrey Ghannam, Goal to Reduce Medical Errors is Fraught With Difficulty, 86
A.B.A. J. 88 (2000); David Orentlicher, Medical Malpractice: Treating the Causes Instead of
the Symptoms, 28 MED CARE 247, 247-49 (2000).
74

See Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1444.

75

See id.

76

See VINCENT & DE MOL, supra note 35, at 70.

77

See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38 and, Leape, supra note 49, at 1852.
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B. Legal Disincentives Error Reporting
Similar to the way the environmental forces of systems influence the endpoint
provider-patient error rate, the medical profession’s perceived “wall of silence”78
does not arise in isolation from factors external to medicine.79 Aside from shame or
guilt, physicians are reluctant to admit errors because of the perceived threat of
litigation or other sanctions.80 Whether this threat is real or imaginary, the legal
culture is a contributing cause of physicians’ reluctance to admit errors.81 Traditional
malpractice claims for negligence, and the discoverability of voluntarily reported
error data are the two primary sources of this reluctance.82 This section explores
these roadblocks to error reporting or error-rate reduction attempts.
The concept of medical malpractice was described in Sir William Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England in 1768.83 In the United States, medical
malpractice claims were uncommon until the mid-1800s.84 The rise in claims in that
era paralleled the development of more standardized medical practice and education,
and the use of innovative techniques by physicians.85 In response to the threat of
suits, many physicians could purchase malpractice insurance by the end of the
nineteenth century.86 Ironically, as innovation and standardization improved medical
knowledge and quality, there arose identifiable “standards” of care which plaintiffs
could allege were breached as the basis for a negligence claim.87 Also, the presence
of liability insurance made physicians more desirable targets for plaintiff’s lawyers, a
feature which persists in the current malpractice system.88
78

See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 69, at 52-54.

79

See Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical
Malpractice as a Barrier, 283 JAMA 1742 (2000).
80
See id. at 1742-43; Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 555-59. Other
sanctions affect government contracts, hospital privileges, or medical licensure. See Gostin,
supra note 79, at 1742-43.
81

See Jeffrey Ghannam, supra note 73, at 88.

82

See id.

83

See James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective,
283 JAMA 1731, 1732 (2000) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 122 (1768), where Blackstone used the term mala praxis to describe neglect or
unskilled practice as breaking a patient’s trust and causing injury). See also Roger N. Braden
& Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Evolution-Breaking the
Revolution, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 675, 693 (1998) (citing Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn.
1794) as the earliest U.S. case of medical malpractice).
84
See Mohr, supra note 83, at 1731-43. According to Mohr, the social factors which
promoted the rise of malpractice litigation included Americans’ less religiously fatalistic
attitude about personal health, and the lack of government or self-regulation of medical
practice. See id.
85

See id. at 1735-37.

86

See id. at 1736-37.

87

See id.

88

See Mohr, supra note 83, at 1731-43.
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Two major goals of medical malpractice litigation are to compensate negligently
injured patients, and to deter negligent behavior.89 Unfortunately, the present legal
system is a very inefficient and inaccurate means of promoting these goals.90 Only a
small percentage of injured patients actually attempt to sue their doctors.91 Many
victims of medical negligence simply fail to realize that they were wrongfully
injured, and fail to seek legal redress.92 Conversely, other patients who have adverse
or suboptimal outcomes not caused by negligence file suit against their providers.93
The legal system’s failure to consistently promote and enforce the injurycompensation and deterrence policies of medical negligence actions has thus failed
to provide clear guidance to the medical community.94 One message is that if a
doctor is negligent, he probably won’t be sued.95 The concurrent message is that
providing non-negligent care is not clearly a shield from patients at least attempting
to sue.96 Therefore, negligent practitioners are neither effectively punished nor
deterred, and the more careful physicians are randomly punished in spite of their
diligence.97
As a result of the apparent randomness of negligence liability, doctors are faced
with a disincentive to report medical errors.98 Additionally, the threat of litigation
promotes defensive medical practices.99 Extra tests, procedures, and therapies are
recommended by doctors in an attempt to avoid gaps where plaintiffs’ lawyers may

89
See Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice Reform-The Long View, 11 J. CLIN. ANES.
265 (1999). A third social function of the tort system is to provide corrective justice, but this
is “impossible to measure.” See id.
90

See id. at 265.

91

See Orentlicher, supra note 73, at 248. Indigent patients are the least likely to sue,
though they are the patients most in need of compensation for injury. See id.
92
See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 69, at 56-57. With the prevalence of personal injury
attorney advertising, patients today are probably more aware of their legal counseling options.
93
See e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 73, at 248 (stating that “most lawsuits are filed in the
absence of negligence.” However, this is probably a reflection of patients’, rather than
attorneys’, misperception of whether negligence occurred. Thus, even diligent pre-suit
screening by attorneys does not adequately prevent such claims); Paul Weiler, The Case for
No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 913 (1993) (claiming lawyers have difficulty
deciding whether to file a claim).
94
See Bryan A. Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety: Charting a Divergent Course,
91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 609 (1999) [hereinafter Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety].
95

See e.g., Weiler, supra note 93, at 912-13 (finding only one-in-three likelihood of
malpractice claims being paid to victims of serious injury caused by negligence).
96

See Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 609.

97

There is also undoubtedly what I would call a “hassle factor” threshold. This is the point
where a non-negligent (from the physician’s viewpoint) physician is willing to settle a claim
for an amount of money that represents the value of closure and ending the personal distress of
litigation.
98

See Leape et al., supra note 52, at 1447.

99

See Weiler, supra note 93, at 916-17.
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seek to establish a foothold.100 These defensive practices are costly in both economic
and human terms. One study estimated the cost of defensive medicine at $18 billion
annually.101 Aside from this economic waste, the mass effect of defensive medicine
increases the risk of medical errors which result in patient injury.102 Thus, the legal
system, or at least medicine’s reaction to it, has a causative role in the medical error
rate. Also, malpractice insurers seem satisfied with the status quo, because of the
actuarial stability it provides, as long as the insurers retain their ability to refuse
coverage of high risk doctors.103
Reducing medical errors should result in higher quality and more cost-effective
care. The first step toward this end is error disclosure, and therein lies the rub.
Given the already unpredictable nature of the medical malpractice tort process,
doctors are unwilling to voluntarily disclose their errors for fear of discovery by
plaintiffs.104 Admitting error so that is may be used against you is either foolish or
masochistic. It’s tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Although state
laws may immunize certain mandated quality assurance monitoring or peer review
processes from liability, they do not always protect the information from
discovery.105 The information from these programs may be discoverable by plaintiffs
under the traditional Hickman v. Taylor substantial need and undue hardship test.106
Also, reporting the information to third parties, such as consultants, private and
federal quality monitoring agencies, or in cases tried in federal courts, immunity may
not apply.107 Hence, absent better assurance that error disclosure will not be
discovered by plaintiffs, the medical community remains reluctant to volunteer this
information.108
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See id., and, Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 610.
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See Weiler, supra note 93, at 916-17.

102

See Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 610.
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See Brennan, supra note 89, at 266.
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See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 55-59.
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See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(1) (2000) (requiring all licensed hospitals to establish
an internal risk management program); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.111, § 203(d) (West
2000)(same). These statutes provide for immunity of risk management data from discovery.
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Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Applies to attorney work product materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation. See id. at 510-11. Alternatively, the information can
sometimes be viewed as factual and thus not covered by the attorney-client privilege under
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981). See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety,
supra note 8, at 558-59. See also Healthtrust v. Saunders, 651 So.2d (Fla. 1995) (denying
discovery in absence of showing need and undue hardship).
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See Liang, supra note 8, at 55-59 and nn. 53-61.
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266

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 16:255

IV. CURES FOR MEDICAL ERRORS
A. Adopt a Systems Approach
If medical errors are not being reduced by the traditional tort system,109 and
individual physicians are operating at a level of efficiency that still produces an
unacceptable error rate,110 then a new model for error reduction is necessary.111 This
model, as previously mentioned, is the systems approach.112 The medical community
has become increasingly aware of the need for such an approach, through studies of
human error psychology and by examining other high-risk industries.113
The medical profession, upon admitting its awareness of the systems-based
influences and causes of medical error, is ethically compelled to pursue this approach
if public opinion is to continue to grant physicians a foothold on the moral high
ground.114 Despite obstacles, including the threat of litigation, the duty owed to
patients is paramount.115 Besides, it would be foolish, and overtly self-destructive, if
medicine waits until forces entirely outside of the profession dictate the terms of this
endeavor. Medicine’s limited remaining capacity to self-regulate would evaporate.
If nothing else, a better approach to reducing errors, and a good faith effort to
implement this approach, is a matter of self-preservation.
Ironically, the threat of litigation has already led to some progress by medicine to
incorporate a systems-based approach. In response to the rising malpractice
insurance costs of the 1980s, the field of anesthesiology became a pioneer in the
application of the systems approach to medical error reduction.116 By assessing the
systems in which anesthesiologists delivered care, and implementing technological
advances, the mortality rate from anesthesia was reduced by over ten-fold.117 The
anesthesiology field’s success was attributable to improved information strategies,
development of practice guidelines and standards, human factors evaluation, strong
leadership, and a multidisciplinary approach.118 Extending this approach to other
areas of medicine appears worthwhile, with adjustments and fine tuning for
outpatient and individual provider settings.
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See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490-92.
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See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 544-45.
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See id.; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 56.
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Id. at 71-75; Leape, supra note 49, at 1854-55.
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See id.; Leape, supra note 49, at 1851.
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Id. at 1856; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 164.
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See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 164 (citing anesthesiology study where anesthesia
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use of monitoring devices).
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See id. at 144-45.
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See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 491-92; Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note
8, at 561-62; Leape, supra note 49, at 1856; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 173-74.
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Leading medical and legal commentators have called for a systems approach to
medicine which is modeled after those used in aviation and nuclear energy.119 These
complex, high-risk industries have studied the causes of human error, and have
implemented systems which reduce the influence of human imperfection.120 The
common feature in these systems is that they expect and anticipate human error, and
thereby integrate their systems to accommodate this reality.121 Given the complexity
and variety of settings for healthcare delivery, there is no one size fits all approach.
However, with some innovative thinking,122 leadership, and grassroots commitment,
medicine can address the systems flaws it now is beginning to acknowledge.123
B. Collect the Data and Encourage Error Reporting
Medical error reduction could lessen the unpredictability of the tort system by
increasing the overall quality of care. Less patients will be injured, shrinking the
pool of potential plaintiffs. To effect this change, errors need to be studied, which
can only happen if they are more comprehensively reported. The ideal error
detection-prevention process should: 1) identify errors by individual providers
practicing substandard care, 2) identify deficiencies which increase the risk of error
by providers within a system, 3) establish methods to reduce errors in both contexts,
and 4) provide legal safeguards and market incentives for voluntary error reporting.
Licensing of individual physicians occurs at the state level. In the 1889 decision
Dent v. West Virginia,124 the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this system as proper to
ensure that physicians had the “requisite qualifications” to practice medicine.125 In
1986, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act established the National Practitioner
Data Bank (NPDB).126 The NPDB stores information about individual provider
malpractice claims and decisions affecting clinical privileges.127 This information is
used for credentialing and licensing purposes, and is protected from discovery by
plaintiffs’ attorneys.128 Also, at the state level, statutes may require reporting of
some adverse patient events.129 Together with traditional tort liability, state laws,
licensing boards, and the NPDB provide checks on physician errors. However, they
are post facto reactive checks that do not systematically address error types and
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See Paul Plsek, Innovative Thinking for the Improvement of Medical Systems, 131 ANN.
INT. MED. 438, 438-44 (1999).
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129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889).

125

See id.

126
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causes, offering only the threat of punishment, which serves as a disincentive to
voluntary error reporting.
A healthcare system can be virtually any level of complexity, but for the
purposes of this analysis, the hospital will be considered as the standard example.130
Though no two hospitals are identical, and each department in a hospital represents a
system within a system, they share some common features. Hospitals are accredited
for the most part by the private, not-for-profit Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).131 Though JCAHO is a private entity,
Medicare132 and many states require JCAHO accreditation as a condition of facility
licensure or certification.133 JCAHO has a “sentinel event” policy which requires
facilities to report certain bad outcomes.134 Hospitals are also commonly required by
state statute to have an internal risk management program to investigate adverse
patient incidents, and develop quality control and improvement programs.135 Thus,
in the hospital context, there is at least some effort to identify and correct system
errors.
A more sophisticated approach is needed for detecting errors in both office and
hospital settings, though.136 Many proposals exist for collecting and analyzing this
data in a way that will provide meaningful insight into the causes of individual and
systems-based errors. One suggestion is for a “patient safety center” under the
auspices of the National Institutes of Health.137 Under this proposal, error reporting
by physicians and institutions would be mandatory, yet non-punitive unless errors
are not reported as required.138 The data would be reported to a neutral third party
which lacks sanctioning ability, similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting System
130

For example, a large outpatient group practice has systems elements, such as practice
protocols, nursing guidelines, or a central pharmacy, to name a few. Arguably, even a solo
practitioner performs under a system, because he or she develops standardized approaches to
common problems, approaches which may promote error if the approaches have latent defects.
131

Managed care organizations such as HMOs are accredited by the National Committee
on Quality Assurance (NCQA), a private organization. See www.ncqa.org.
132
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395X(e), 1395bb. (2000) JCAHO accreditation suffices for Medicare
certification purposes.
133
See FLA. STAT. § 395.0161. For example, Florida allows JCAHO accreditation in lieu
of state periodic inspection.
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See Bryan A. Liang and Kristopher Storti, Creating Problems as Part of the Solution:
The JCAHO Sentinel Events Policy, Legal Issues and Patient Safety, 33 AMER. J. HEALTH L.
263, 264 (2000).
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See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (providing for, “a) the investigation and analysis of the
frequency and causes of general categories of specific types of adverse incidents to patients.”
and “b) the development of appropriate measures to minimize the risk of adverse incidents to
patients. . .”).
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See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 861-62 (1995) (suggesting that medical
license boards have little effect on error rates).
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(ASRS).139 Other proposals include data collection by the National Patient Safety
Foundation,140 or a federally funded Center for Quality Improvement in Patient
Safety.141
Assuming that a data collection center is established, one problem that the data
collectors will have is deciding what data to gather.142 This is a technical issue
beyond the scope of this paper.143 It is sufficient to note that merely collecting the
data is a daunting task, subject to abstraction and interpretation bias.144
Another concern with mandatory error reporting is liability exposure.
Threatening to punish reporting failures may have some coercive influence,145 but
does not efficiently promote the ultimate goal of simply obtaining the errors
information for analysis and systems improvements. Fully anonymous reporting
might provide raw data, but would not lead consistently to corrective measures at
specific sites, because only widespread problems would be addressable. In the
absence of anonymity then, what should be done to promote error disclosure
information which is more useful to address problems at specific sites?
Granting liability immunity to those who provide error data is one solution.146
Many states already grant immunity to peer review and utilization review
organizations.147 As noted earlier, such immunity does not extend to “administrative
information,” such as certain safety data.148 For example, in State ex rel. United
Hospital v. Bedell,149 the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a hospital’s incident
report, made after a patient was injured in the hospital, was not immune from
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See id. at 561-62. The ASRS collects data and provides it to NASA rather than the
FAA. Bypassing the FAA, which has the authority to sanction pilots and carriers, promotes
voluntary error reporting. See id.
140
See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490. The National Patient Safety Foundation was
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to medical errors. See id.
141
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2000.
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1997).
143
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immunity to committee procedures and members, respectively); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.111,
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discovery because it was not a document prepared in anticipation of litigation.150
Other limitations on immunity may include the reports of peer review panels151 or
information disclosed to third parties.152 If states wish to encourage error reporting,
legislators may wish to extend immunity privileges to error data collecting activities.
However, even if full immunity is not granted, some error data should be reportable
without fear of litigation, such as when there has been no actual patient harm.153
Instead of reporting medical errors directly to a national databank, I propose a
different approach which is market-based and operates principally at the state level.
A national databank would be unlikely to account for regional practice differences,
and the solutions proposed would be aimed at a national lowest common
denominator. It is preferable to collect data at the state level, where accountability
and flexibility are more immediate.154 This would allow a variety of approaches, and
states which evolve desirable systems more rapidly than other states could serve as
models.155 State legislatures, insurers, regulators, and professional organizations
could look to these leading states and incorporate reporting systems features most
desirable for their own state. Market forces, such as funding decisions and insurance
rates, would provide incentives not to be a laggard state. Similarly, states would also
decide immunity issues for themselves. The data collected could still be passed on to
a national databank, which could assess the data and make further
recommendations.156 Rather than being used as a justification for new federal
legislation, these recommendations could be used by market actors to provide
incentives for states to evolve their own data collection process. In this way,
desirable market forces and state autonomy would be preserved.
Instead of creating yet another federal bureaucracy,157 with all of the attendant
inefficiencies, funding decisions for medical errors data collection and analysis,
should occur using private resources at the state level. However, I do not suggest a
state bureaucracy instead of a federal one. The data should be collected by a private
company, which need not be confined to a state’s borders. The private company
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See Bayfront Medical Center v. State, 741 So.2d 1226,1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
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were) (emphasis added).
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could contract directly with providers, who would incorporate the cost of collecting
data into the cost of doing business. The state could allow one or more such private
entities to collect the data along specified parameters, and then report their findings
directly to the state.158 Such a system would be cost-effective through the avoidance
of fines and sanctions for failing to report errors, and ultimately through actual error
reduction which results in lower liability insurance and litigation costs. Any void in
the market which presently exists for a private errors data collecting entity will be
more efficiently filled by a private information technology company than by a new
government bureaucracy, and market competition would promote efficiency and
results.
C. Standards of Care and the Use of Practice Guidelines
If a systems approach is adopted, and data collected, there remains the problem
of how best to use the information in order to reduce errors. It may appear obvious
that errors will decrease by applying the best known practices to each patient.159
However, medicine is less well suited for standardization than certain purely
mechanical tasks, because of individual patient diversity and complexity.160 Also,
many medical problems can be successfully treated in more than one way, which
suggests there is not always a ready applicable “best” method for a given patient or
problem.161 In spite of these difficulties, some standardization of medicine is
possible to reduce patient risk.162 Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) have thus
emerged, and are developed continuously, with an emphasis on scientific evidentiary
support.163 This section discusses how these guidelines affect the legal standard of
care.
Traditionally, the legal standard for medical negligence was based on the local
practice custom established by the medical community.164 As medical knowledge
158
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and sophistication evolved, so did the legal standard in two main ways. First, a
national standard of care applies to doctors practicing anywhere in the country, with
some variation allowed to account for urban versus rural settings and resource
availability.165 Second, regardless of a particular community’s customs, the objective
standard of “skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession
in good standing in similar communities” applies.166 This objective standard may at
times serve as a basis to impugn an industry-wide practice as negligent. A striking
example was the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling in Helling v. Carey,167 which
declared that failure to screen a young patient for glaucoma was negligence, even
though it was not usual practice for eye doctors to perform screening at that age.168
Thus, the law has forced medical standards of care to evolve, because the standard of
care is ultimately a legal, rather than a medical, question.169
Perhaps partly as a response to the law, medicine at the dawn of the 21st century
is attempting to systematize and objectify standards of care through the
establishment of CPGs based on scientific evidence.170 The Institute of Medicine
defines CPGs as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”171
CPGs are generally developed by academic leaders and authoritative bodies for
particular medical specialties.172 CPGs were initially promulgated as a quality
improvement tool, but have also become cost-containment devices.173 Whether used
to improve quality or lower costs, or both, a strong emphasis on evidence based
medicine (EBM) is stressed as an underpinning for all CPGs.174 It is believed that a
165
See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 879 (Miss. 1985) (allowing out of state physician
expert witnesses to testify regarding standard of care in Mississippi, so long as the experts
were made familiar with with the local “facilities, equipment, personnel and general medical
resources available”).
166
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168
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Gates v. Jensen, 579 P.2d 374, 376 (Wash. 1978) (re-imposing traditional standard of “that
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strong scientific evidentiary basis for CPGs will promote broader applicability and
acceptance by practitioners in a variety of clinical settings.175
In theory, well designed and widely followed CPGs will reduce medical error
through better overall practice quality.176 However, the potential or actual use of
CPGs as the legal standard of care in negligence actions has caused doctors to
hesitate in accepting them.177 One solution to reduce physician apprehension is to
allow CPG use as purely exculpatory evidence in a malpractice suit.178 Maine and
Kentucky have enacted statutes which adopt this approach, at least to some degree.179
Ironically, such an approach may serve to reduce already low compliance with
CPGs, because plaintiffs would not be able to introduce evidence of
noncompliance.180 Thus, if CPGs are to function as effective error reduction
mechanisms, they must be widely followed by doctors, so it may be important to
allow plaintiffs to introduce evidence of CPG noncompliance.181 However, a catch22 situation could result if the law encourages compliance with guidelines as a
presumptive standard of care, since the more widespread the use of CPGs becomes,
the more they can be used against providers, irrespective of the broader quality of
care effects of a given CPG.182 In this respect, physician reluctance to accept CPGs
is rational.
The goal of this discussion of CPGs is to emphasize caution by courts and
legislators in adopting CPGs as legal standards of care. Medical errors will be
175
See id. But see John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15
J. LEGAL MED. 421 (1999). Ayres states that “the strength of the scientific data and expert
judgment should be made explicit in the guideline.” See id. at 427. Further, he argues that
guidelines may be no more authoritative than text books or learned treatises, and that
guidelines often address controlled environments, like operating rooms. Also guidelines may
be biased toward academic practice settings, failing to account for differences between urban
and rural settings, and that guidelines are often outdated by the time they are published. See
id. at 427-32.
176
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judgments to standardized formulas. . .[CPGs] would tend to undermine professional
autonomy,” and physicians’ perception that “third party payers will use them to deny payment
for care that doctors believe should be provided to their patients. . .” See id.
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179
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Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 57 (1994) (expressing concern that guidelines “may
inappropriately or inadvertently reduce the quality of care”) (emphasis added).
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reduced by widespread application of what actually works best for a particular
clinical scenario.183 However, blind adherence to CPGs may actually promote
medical errors.184 CPGs must be developed with some inherent flexibility to allow
for specific resource limitations, practice style differences, and individual patient
variables and preferences.185 A per se approach that CPG conformity is not
malpractice may unfairly prevent recovery by a patient who is injured by a
physician’s negligent adherence to a CPG.186 Conversely, overly rigid CPGs might
expose a doctor to liability when the reasonable and prudent approach is to not
follow a CPG.187 A more workable legal approach is to incorporate CPGs as
admissible evidence or as burden shifting devices in malpractice actions.188
D. Enterprise Liability
If liability risks deter error reporting by physicians, perhaps the law can alleviate
this concern. As individual practitioner liability laws have evolved, so has the law
with respect to insurers and hospitals. Physicians have traditionally been the primary
target of malpractice actions. Until the 1950s, hospitals were legally protected under
the doctrine of charitable immunity,189 and doctors were usually viewed as
independent contractors rather than agents or employees of the hospital.190 Insurers
were also insulated by the system of fee-for-service retrospective payment, because
they were not actively involved in patient treatment decisions.191 For various policy
and economic reasons, the law began to accept hospital and insurer vicarious or
direct liability theories to allow plaintiff recovery in malpractice cases.192 This
section discusses these theories using the term “Enterprise Liability (EL)” to
encompass hospitals, insurers, and managed care and health maintenance
organizations (MCOs, HMOs).
183

See Rosoff, supra note 161, at 2.

184

See Ayres, supra note 175, at 442 (stating “[i]n some situations, adhering to guideline
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185
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See generally President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
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Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American
Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 385 (1994) (discussing demise of charitable
immunity doctrine).
190
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(Bd. ed.1997).
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See Abraham and Weiler, supra note 189, at 394-96. Insurers became more active
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192

See FURROW, supra note 190, at 238-44.

2001-02]

MEDICAL ERRORS

275

Enterprise liability is not a novel concept. Rather, it is derived from the theory of
respondeat superior, a policy-based tort theory which shifts the risk of liability to a
company for the acts of its workers acting within their scope of duty.193 The policy is
based on the assumption that it is better to have companies insure consumers and
others against losses than for potential tort victims to self-insure.194 The theory
expanded to apply in the products liability context.195 EL has been extended to the
medical malpractice context, albeit less thoroughly.196 Vicarious liability is
straightforward when a provider is an employee of a health plan or hospital, but
when the provider is an independent contractor, EL generally rests upon how much
control the enterprise exerted in a particular clinical situation.197 Thus, if a hospital
or other entity directly controlled a clinical decision,198 or owned and operated
particular equipment,199 a plaintiff may have a viable EL claim. Also, EL may apply
where a patient reasonably perceives and relies upon an apparent agency relationship
between the provider and enterprise.200
Besides vicarious liability, an enterprise may be directly liable for negligence.
Mere cost-saving attempts are not negligent, as noted this year by the Supreme Court
in Pegram v. Hedrich.201 However, an institution may be directly liable for failure to
follow established protocols to provide an acceptable standard of care. For example,
the Illinois Supreme Court held in Jones v. Chicago HMO202 that an HMO may be
liable for enrolling too many patients with a single doctor.203 There is considerable
jurisdictional variation in applying EL legal standards, though. State statutes may
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194

See George I. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1535 (1987). See also Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform:
Managing Care and Managing Risk, in CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE
REFORM 45, 47 (William R. Frey ed., 1995).
195
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897 (Cal. 1963) as a landmark decision applying enterprise liability).
196

See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 189, at 383-84.

197

See FURROW, supra note 190, at 240-45.

198
See e.g., Berel v. HCA Health Servs., 881 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App. 1994) (controlling
details of provider’s practice decisions could create EL).
199

This is known as the “inherent function test.” See FURROW, supra note 190, at 250-51
(citing Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (finding hospital
liable for x-ray equipment malfunction which injured patient, because hospital owned and
maintained the equipment)).
200

See e.g., Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756, 775 (Ill. 1999) (finding HMO
vicariously liable under apparent agency theory).
201

530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000).

202

HMO, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000).

203

See id. at 1135.
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govern whether an HMO or other insurance plan can be sued for negligence.204
Another means of finding an enterprise liable is under a negligence per se theory,
where the institute violates a statute directly or by failing to establish and follow
protocols required by statute. For example, in Edwards v. Brandywine Hospital,205
the court concluded that a violation of a Health Department standard could be per se
negligence.206
Aside from state statutory preclusion of EL, another significant obstacle to
plaintiffs is ERISA207 preemption, which allows certain health plans to avoid state
law claims for decisions that “relate to” health care plan administration.208
Fortunately for some plaintiffs, and perhaps also for physicians who desire the risksharing of EL, some courts are excluding state law based tort claims from ERISA
preemption. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage209
held that a vicarious liability malpractice claim could be remanded to state court and
was not preempted.210 The Circuit Courts are divided with respect to state law tort
claims and ERISA preemption.211 The Supreme Court did not directly address the
state law claims issue from Pacificare and similar cases such as Pegram v.
Hedrich.212 Thus, at least in some jurisdictions, health plans and other insurers face a
204

This applies to direct or vicarious liability contexts. See e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1371.25 (Deering 2001) (allowing negligence actions against HMOs). But see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-25 (West 1999) (prohibiting negligence claims against HMOs).
205

652 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).

206

See id. at 1386-87.

207

The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2002). Note that
hospital liability is generally not at issue in this context.
208
ERISA, The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2002) et
seq., was intended by Congress to protect employees from health care plan abuses, but it has
become a major weapon for health plans and insurers to limit their liability. See Larry J.
Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial
Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 358-59 (1994). A detailed discussion of ERISA
preemption is beyond the scope of this paper. Pittman’s article provides an in-depth review of
ERISA, and he points out how ERISA is being used to “thwart the development of the law” in
the area of third party negligence. See id. at 356-59.
209

59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).

210

See id. at 153.

211

Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). The court describes the division among
various District Courts on the issue. See id. at 153, n.2. See e.g., Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing state court negligence action for prematurely
discharging newborn from hospital). But see McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28,
38 (1st. Cir. 1998) (finding negligence claim ERISA preempted); Jass v. Prudential Health
Care Plan, 188 F.3d 1482, 1494 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). See generally Bryan A. Liang, Patient
Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 36-45 (1998) (discussing ERISA
preemption and split among federal courts).
212

530 U.S. 211 (2000). The Court unanimously held that breach of fiduciary duty was not
an ERISA-based cause of action. See id. at 214. In dictum, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility of state law claims avoiding ERISA preemption, “[t]he eligibility decision and the
treatment decision were inextricably mixed.” See id. at 229. The Court went on to state “[n]or
have we reason to discuss the interaction of such a claim with state law causes of action.” See
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lesser risk of state law tort liability, which allows them to avoid blame or shift it to
the individual provider.213 This risk avoidance tactic seems to lessen the incentive to
reduce medical error through cooperative quality improvement efforts between plans
and providers.
As noted earlier, the current tort system does not effectively or efficiently deter
malpractice by individual providers.214 If one accepts the premise that malpractice is
causally related to the rate of medical errors, then reducing malpractice would reduce
errors. To enhance the deterrence effect and efficiency of the tort system, it makes
sense to extend the liability risk to the enterprises on the delivery side of health
care.215 Although moral and ethical considerations should prompt efforts to reduce
negligence and the resultant errors which harm patients, economic motivation will
create a more practical necessity for change.216 Sharing liability with providers will
force enterprises to foster an effective partnership with providers to reduce the costs
of medical errors by improving healthcare quality at all levels.217 Part of the
enterprise’s burden should ideally include informing patients with quality of care and
error data, so that enterprises will face additional market pressure to improve care.218
E. Alternatives to the Standard Negligence Approach
As noted in the preceding section, enterprise liability may encourage efforts to
reduce medical errors by creating a shared risk-benefit between providers and
hospitals and hospitals or insurers. Enterprise liability theory still operates under a
standard negligence model, though, because it merely extends duty to the enterprise
through a vicarious or direct mechanism. There are alternative liability theories
which focus on other ways to reduce medical errors and their negative impacts or
resultant liability risks. The theories this section discusses are: apology; no-fault;
and strict liability.

id. at n.9. The Court may be asked to resolve the meaning of “inextricably mixed” in a future
case. Does it mean a negligence claim must be preempted for any ERISA plan?
213

See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy,
283 JAMA 921 (2000). The authors point out that ERISA-based plans cover 125 million
Americans (citing Department of Labor estimates). See id. at 921.
214

See William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health
Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2-3 (1994).
215

See id. at 7.

216

See Stuart Speiser et al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §1:30 (1983).

217

See Sage, supra note 214, at 1-3.

218

See Priest, supra note 194, at 1537. “It is well accepted that the optimal level of
accident prevention will be attained if incentives are created for both the provider and
consumer to make additional safety investments up to the point at which the marginal costs of
such investments equal their marginal benefits.” See id. But see Clark C. Havighurst,
Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 7, 14-15 (2000). Havighurst suggests that “the market alone cannot provide appropriate
incentives to maintain quality because consumers cannot, in most cases, reliably assess the
value of the services they receive. The policy problem therefore, is to narrow the extent to
which consumer ignorance allows providers to give less than optimal care. . .” See id.
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It seems like an ethical no-brainer that physicians who err should inform the
patient of this fact as soon as the doctor learns it, regardless of actual harm.219 This is
consistent with the highest form of professional ethics.220 However, there may be
instances where error disclosure might harm the patient through adverse
psychological effects.221 If this is the learned and reasonable judgment of a
physician, then it seems ethical to not disclose an error to certain patients.222
Conversely, error disclosure could actually increase a patient’s confidence in a
provider.223 By admitting error, the physician exposes his own humanity, which a
patient may not only empathize with but be reassured by, because they perceive their
doctor as someone who is honest and will strive to protect the patient’s interests.224
The default ethical position should be to disclose the error to the patient, unless it is
clear that the patient will be harmed by the disclosure.225
Unfortunately, a doctor’s decision to admit error and apologize for it is not, at
least psychologically, just a straightforward ethical question. Doctors fear being
sued if they admit errors.226 In some instances, there is actual patient harm from a
medical error, and the doctor will settle a claim or lose in court, irrespective of
whether the doctor admits any error. Most doctors probably agree that professional
standards are maintained at higher levels by punishing certain negligent providers.
Are there situations where doctors can admit their errors without risking a
lawsuit?227 Certainly, if a patient isn’t harmed, then there may be no damages to

219

See Loeben, supra note 9, at 81 (stating “on one side are individuals who feel strongly
that patients should be told.”). In fact, it is conceivable that the primary doctor should
honestly address errors made by nurses or other providers. See id. See also Vogel & Delgado,
supra note 69, at 94 (concluding that physicians should have a legal duty to admit errors,
“because the medical profession does not regulate itself effectively, discourages the reporting
of malpractice to patients, and erects formal and informal barriers to patients’ access to
information.”) (emphasis added).
220

See Rosner et al., supra note 153, at 2092 (concluding that “truth telling should not be
the mark of the heroic physician but rather a distinguishing feature of all decent physicians.”).
221

See Loeben, supra note 9, at 81.

222

See id.

223

See id. at 83 (stating “patients can understand and accept medical error much easier than
they can understand and accept medical dishonesty.”).
224

See Steve S. Kramer & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May be the
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999) (citing study which showed 43 percent
of families were motivated to sue in part because of a suspicion of a cover-up, betrayal of
trust, or desire for revenge).
225

See id. at 967.

226

See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 764-66. The authors point out that failure to
admit error is ethically contradictory to physicians’ “fierce ethic of individual responsibility.”
See id. at 764.
227
See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1473-74. The Lexington VA Hospital experience has been
positive in this respect, both economically and ethically. In addition, telling the truth may
improve morale by allowing providers to do the “right thing.” Besides morale boosting,
apology may have positive effects on business goodwill and reputation. Cohen uses the
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interest a plaintiff’s attorney. However, the patient could fire the doctor, or
somehow impugn the doctor’s reputation, so the doctor may still have an economic
incentive to remain silent. Perhaps, though, there is a human tendency to forgive that
is being overlooked by doctors (or hospitals and insurers).228 It is doubtful that
doctors are widely actually dishonest or are perceived as dishonest.229 Unfortunately,
it is the medical culture itself which inhibits a more optimal level of honesty with
respect to medical errors.230 Fortunately, medical leaders are realizing that admitting
errors is one step toward fixing the overall problem, and is a better ethical
approach.231
Apology presents a cost-effective and ethical approach to medical errors in a
context like a Veterans’ Administration Hospital, partly because providers are
insulated from individual liability.232 In the private sector context, the applicability
of apology may be limited to the enterprise’s willingness to accept or share the
liability risk with the individual provider.233 One approach that automatically
imposes risk on the enterprise is a no-fault system of medical injury liability, which
focuses on causation rather than duty.234 The proponents of various no-fault systems
argue that such systems reduce administrative costs and improve compensation to
injured patients.235 Florida already has a limited no-fault medical liability system,

example of Johnson & Johnson’s behavior in response to the Tylenol poisoning scandal. See
id. at 1474-76.
228

But see Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at
the Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 196 (2000) (citing studies which show declining
public confidence in medical practitioners).
229
In my personal experience as a physician, patients seem quite willing to forgive
mistakes, such as medication side effects, when I apologize to them and emphasize my
willingness to continue to help them fix their problem. In another context, perhaps President
Clinton could have avoided impeachment if he had been promptly honest and apologetic for
his sexual indiscretions. In that context, though, unwillingness to be honest may reflect a
more fundamental character trait, which is arguably selected by the political process.
230
See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763; Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error,
supra note 51, at 1444.
231

See Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1447.

232

See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 224, at 965. VA providers do not pay malpractice
premiums, and are not named individually in malpractice claims. They are reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank for actual malpractice payouts. See id. Malpractice insurers
also contribute to physicians’ reluctance to admit errors, but if the insurers realized a net
savings from honest error admission, they would probably be more receptive to this approach.
See id. at 965-67.
233

See id.

234
See e.g., Abraham & Weiler, supra note 189, at 432-36 (promoting no-fault approach to
medical malpractice); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury:
Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 99-120 (1998) (analyzing pros and cons of nofault system); Paul C. Weiler, supra note 93, at 950 (1993) (favoring no-fault approach).
235

See e.g., Weiler, supra note 93, at 923-35 (discussing benefits of no-fault compensation
to injured patients, and decreased administrative costs).
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which applies to Workers’ Compensation and brain-damaged newborns.236 Data
indicates that administrative costs are lower and patients are compensated faster than
in the traditional tort system, though overall costs are not lower.237
Strict liability has also been proposed as a method to reform the current
malpractice system.238 Strict liability theory is a policy based cost-shifting
mechanism which is applied to promote public safety through injury prevention.239
Strict liability has yet to be applied to medical services, but is applicable to certain
medical devices under products liability laws.240 For example, in Porter v.
Rosenberg,241 Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals acknowledged that strict
liability applied to silicone breast implant manufacturers and distributors.242
However, the surgeon in the case was not strictly liable for selecting and using the
implant.243 The Porter court left open the possibility of strict liability for a service
provider where the “essence of the transaction” between the patient and the provider
was akin to a business-customer relationship.244
V. CAPITALISM
A. The Entitlement Mentality
This discussion of the causes and potential solutions to medical errors is
incomplete without at least a brief analysis of the roles of patients as consumers, and
the economic forces which have fostered and perpetuated the current healthcare
market in the United States.245 As discussed in section II.C of this article, healthcare

236

See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 234, at 82-83 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 766.305,
766.315, and describing a similar approach in Virginia).
237

See id.

238

See Barry Furrow, Defective Medical Treatment: A Proposal For the Application of
Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U. L. REV. 392, 434 (concluding strict liability
should apply to “defective medical treatment” in a manner similar to products liability).
239

See id. at 410-411.

240

See FURROW, supra note 190, at 265-70. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965), provided the traditional rule of products liability. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 558 (1998). There is now a RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS (1997) devoted specifically to products liability. See id.
241

650 So.2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

242

See id. at 81.

243

See id. at 83. See also Tanuz v. Culberg, 921 P.2d 309, 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)
(concluding that public policy precluded strict liability against physician using jaw joint
implants).
244

See Porter, 650 So.2d at 83.

245

A detailed discussion of either is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Weiler,
supra note 93, at 950 (favoring no-fault); Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 234, at 99-120
(discussing pros and cons); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology,
Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. L. REV. 293, 306310 (1988) (discussing strict liability, effects of technology, and transaction costs).
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delivery ultimately occurs at the individual patient level.246 Patients’ perceptions,
and their willingness or ability to pay for their own medical care influence the rate of
medical errors.247 The law operates in this context to support, propagate, or even
expand error rates.
At this point in our nation’s history, universal healthcare is not a fundamental
right.248 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to healthcare under the
Eighth Amendment for prison inmates,249 and under the Fourteenth Amendment for
confined mental patients,250 due to these groups’ “special relationship” with the
government. In other cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly refused to grant
healthcare the status of a fundamental right. In Harris v. McRae, the Court rejected a
right to state funded abortions.251 In Youngberg v. Romeo,252 the Court stated that it
was an “established principal” that “[a]s a general matter, a State is under no
constitutional duty to provide substantive services within its border.”253 The
Youngberg Court did find a due process right to minimally adequate training to
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint for a severely retarded patient who
was involuntarily committed.254 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to grant
constitutional right status to healthcare for the general population, suggesting a
proper deference to the political process and legislature.
In every state, though, there already exists broad access to medical care through
Medicaid255 and Medicare256 programs. Medicaid, a federally assisted state program,
provides coverage to needy children and adults. Medicare, also federally funded,
provides coverage for the disabled and for persons over age sixty-five. Thus, even
though there is not an absolute right to healthcare, benefit programs already exist for
those patients willing to declare and substantiate their need for assistance.
Patients not covered by Medicaid or Medicare rely upon employer provided
insurance benefits, or must purchase their own coverage out-of-pocket. This still
246

See supra notes 234-44 and accompanying text.

247

See supra note 246.

248

See e.g., Van M. Halley, The Right to Health Care: Key Policy Issue or Useless
Concept, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 101, 120 (1993) (stating that absent a “special relationship”
between the state and a patient, healthcare is not a constitutional right).
249

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976) (stating it would be “cruel and
unusual punishment” to deny prisoners adequate healthcare).
250

See 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982).

251

448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).

252

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.

253

See id. at 324-25.

254

See id.

255
42 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (2000) et seq. Established in 1965, Medicaid provides, “(1) medical
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children. . . whose income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary services,” and “(2) rehabilitation and other services
to help such families attain of retain capability for independence or self care. . .”
256

42 U.S.C.S. § 426 (2000) et seq. Also established in 1965, Medicare provides for
healthcare for individuals over age 65, and disabled individuals. See id. at §§ 426(a)-(b).
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leaves as many as forty-four million Americans without health insurance.257
Proponents of universal health insurance emphasize these uncovered millions when
such plans are debated.258 What such proposals ignore, though, is the dynamic nature
of this uninsured group. Most are young and between jobs, and many have simply
chosen to not purchase insurance.259 Many of those between jobs could have elected
to continue employer-sponsored coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Act of 1985 (COBRA) for at least eighteen months.260 In contrast, less than one
percent of the elderly are without insurance.261 Therefore, those who need insurance
the most, the poor, disabled, and elderly, already have access to it through existing
programs. It may be that younger people without insurance have simply accepted a
certain risk in exchange for saving money not spent on insurance.
Even if universal healthcare attained legal right status, there would remain the
fact that medical services must be paid for. This is where the entitlement mentality
rears its ugly head, because too many patients insist upon a scope of services which
they are unable or unwilling to pay for. Patients are too often not aware of the true
costs of coverage and services, creating what one commentator describes as a “moral
hazard.”262 Instead of using health insurance for the usual insurance function as
protection against unpredictable loss, people tend to “over-insure” themselves for
healthcare.263 They do so in large part because the law promotes employer and
government sponsored insurance.264 Patients are thereby encouraged to assume that
their care is or should be paid for by their employers or the government.265
The economic reality, which such a mindset ignores, is that neither the
government nor employers actually pay for healthcare. The government creates no
wealth, it can only confiscate and redistribute it through what Frederic Bastiat
257

See www.hhs.gov, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) website,
testimony of Claude Earl Fox, M.D., Administrator of the Health Resources and Services
Administration, before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
Subcommittee on Public Health, March 23, 2000. Website accessed Oct. 13, 2000. See also
Geri Aston, Uninsured Numbers Down; Struggle Goes On, 43 AMER. MED. NEWS, Oct. 16,
2000, at 5 (citing U.S. Census Bureau figures which show 42.6 million uninsured Americans
in 1999, down 1.7 million from 1998).
258
See e.g., James E. Dalen, Health Care in America: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
160 ARCH. INT. MED. 2573, 2575 (2000) (citing figure of 43 million uninsured Americans, and
advocating employer mandated health insurance); Frank Davidoff, The 28th Amendment, 130
ANN. INT. MED. 692-94 (1999) (suggesting constitutional amendment to provide universal
health insurace).
259

See supra note 257, HHS website data (describing uninsured as commonly between
ages 21 and 24, and workers who experienced “some unemployment”).
260

29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1161, 1162(2) (2000).

261

See supra note 257.

262

See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law-We Need to Talk!, 19
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84, 86-88 (2000).
263

See id. at 88.

264

See id. at 87-88.

265

See id.
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accurately labeled as “legal plunder.”266 The government does not pay for anything,
the productive citizens do. Employers also do not pay for healthcare, because the
costs are passed on to consumers through higher prices, and to employees through
wages adjusted for the expense of insurance. Therefore, what those who claim is an
entitlement to healthcare are really demanding is the property of their fellow citizens,
and they must rely on the coercive power of the government to take it for them.267
Perhaps before patients insist upon an entitlement to the fruits of their fellow
citizens’ labor, they should pause to consider the consequences of such a mentality.
For example, a prominent feature of the 2000 presidential campaign was each
candidate’s prescription drug plan for Medicare patients.268 The premises of such
plans were flawed in at least two major ways. First, the vast majority of Medicare
patients are over age sixty-five, a segment of the population which is wealthier on
average than the younger people who will pay the lion’s share of the cost. Second,
these proposals for prescription drugs create a disincentive for younger people to
save for their retirement needs.269 Plans like these only reinforce the entitlement
mentality by passing along costs to those who bear the burden of paying for others’
healthcare.270 Do the Medicare beneficiaries of such plans properly view their desire
for prescription drugs as a burden on their children and neighbors?
The impact of the entitlement mentality on medical errors should be self-evident.
At some point, freedom of choice is restricted by the strings attached to entitlement
programs. For example, only certain doctors or hospitals will accept Medicare or
Medicaid. The patient is thus less able to effectively provide the economic
incentives to reduce medical error by seeking care from competing providers. Thus,
shielding selected providers from full-fledged market competition reduces the threat
that patients will shop elsewhere for a lower error-rate doctor or hospital. Without
such an economic threat, providers have less incentive to improve quality through
reduced error rates.
B. Contractual Freedom
Suppose the federal government, responding to “the high price of automobiles,”
enacted legislation to provide universal automobile purchasing insurance. An
insurance policy, provided by the government or the employer, allows each citizen to
purchase a car from a participating auto maker. Each insured person purchases the
car he or she wants, as long as the purchase is pre-approved.271 This creates an

266

See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 10-13 (Dean Russell trans., Foundation for Economic
Education, Inc., 1997) (1850).
267

See id.

268

See Michael Fumento, Bribing the Elderly: Bush and Gore Push Free Drugs In Bid for
Key Votes, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 6, 2000, at A24.
269

See id.

270

See Robert J. Samuelson, It’s More Than a Drug Problem, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000,

at 37.
271

Analogous to the prospective payment system for healthcare. See generally, Abraham
& Weiler, supra note 189, at 393-96 (describing prospective payment system). This analogy
is perhaps tenuous with respect to emergency medical care, because people do not have the
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incentive for each person to use the insurance and purchase the most expensive car
allowed by the policy, regardless of need or ability to pay.272 At some point, the
program becomes too costly, and a limit is placed on car prices. It is illegal for the
seller to exceed the price limits, or to allow any covered person to pay the seller
directly for amounts that exceed coverage limits.273 Participating car sellers would
then attempt to maximize profit by reducing production costs, motivated to improve
quality only to the extent of the buyers’ ability to choose between participating
sellers.
It is hard to imagine Americans accepting such restrictions on their choice of
what car they can buy, yet such a system already exists to limit individual choice for
healthcare, arguably a more personal choice than choosing a car.274 The providers of
healthcare, primarily doctors and hospitals, though private insurers may also be
included here, are similarly restricted in their choices of what care to provide.275
Contractual freedom to choose either the care received or the care provided is
restricted.276 If freedom to choose is restricted by non-market forces, then incentives
to improve quality are reduced to the extent competition is discouraged. This
translates into a suboptimal climate for medical error detection, admission, and
reduction.277 Therefore, both patients and providers must have greater contractual
freedom if market efficiencies are to affect medical error reduction.278
One example on the provider side of healthcare contracts is “without cause”
termination clauses. Professor Liang calls for an end to these clauses in provider

same emergency need to purchase a car. However, the point is, that some thought must be
given to healthcare ahead of time, because nearly everyone will eventually need medical care.
272
See Havighurst, supra note 262, at 99 (describing healthcare costs, stating
“. . .consumers do not regularly or systematically compare benefits to cost. . .”).
273

See id. at 89. “The rising costs of the public programs led eventually to regulation-like
reforms. . .” of medical care. See id.
274

See id. With respect to medicine, Havighurst states that, “Congress could not have
forseen how the infusion of so much money into the health care system, coupled with the
moral hazard that accompanies any form of third-party payment, would forever alter not just
the economics but also the culture of medical care.” I disagree that this was not foreseeable.
The effects of government financing and regulation are foreseeable when economic
motivation is considered in terms of dynamic rather than static terms. I doubt that Congress
couldn’t have foreseen this. Medicare is properly viewed as a political strategy to influence
voters, rather than a sound economic program.
275

See id. at 89-92.

276

See id. at 96. “Not only are many important aspects of health care transactions
prescribed by explicit regulation, but today’s health care contracts do not even attempt to
specify in customized terms the desired character, quantity, and quality of the services that
customers purchase.” See id. Havighurst, supra note 262 at 96.
277

See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 7, at 565, (describing need to end
“without cause” termination clauses in provider contracts in order to encourage provider
participation in error reporting).
278

See id. (discussing provider choice); Havighurst, supra note 262, at 97 (discussing
consumer choice).
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contracts with HMOs and other managed care entities.279 This will encourage
physicians to report errors without fear of backlash.280 Unfortunately, Professor
Liang’s remedy is federal legislation, thus further entangling the government in our
healthcare system.281 This is like Socrates asking for more hemlock. Physicians
should admit they are in their current situation precisely because they have lobbied
for federal involvement in healthcare, and they helped get Medicare and Medicaid
passed in the first place.282 Now physicians lament the fact that the market has
reacted to restrict their contractual freedom.283 A sounder approach by physicians to
obtain contractual freedom is to reject these contracts up front, or argue in court that
they should not be enforced for policy reasons.284 Otherwise the medical community
is further abdicating its position as a market player to the federal government. The
result can only be increased dependency on government for subsequent solutions.285
On the patient side of healthcare contracts, contractual freedom needs to be
enhanced as well.286 As with physicians, though, patients are also to blame for the
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current restrictions on their choices.287 Clearly, not all patients have voted to involve
the federal government in financing healthcare.288 However, the political process
continues to operate under the premise that one group of voters, particularly the
elderly with respect to healthcare, can organize to redistribute the wealth of other
citizens to pay for the elders’ healthcare.289 Politicians fall in line because their main
goal is re-election.290 While it is true that this disparity cannot progress
indefinitely,291 the concept of medicine and other entitlement programs must be
addressed realistically.292 Either patients must accept greater responsibility for their
family’s healthcare, or they must accept choice limitations along with the money
redistributed from others.293 The causal chain of events for the latter is less choice,
less competition, and less pressure to improve quality and reduce medical errors.
It should be clear that neither providers nor patients can have their cake and eat it
too, when the assertion is made that medical error reduction will be enhanced by
contractual freedom. Doctors, patients, and politicians will continue to be motivated
by their own self-interest.294 In general it is just such self-interest which enhances
market efficiency.295 However, the redistribution mentality of healthcare thwarts this
efficiency, because too few people are actually aware of what their own healthcare
costs.296 Thus, there is less bargaining in the traditional contract sense.297 Both sides
of the bargain need to acknowledge that by asking the government to get involved in
healthcare financing, they have relinquished their bargaining power.298 Unless the
provider-patient transaction occurs in a more arms-length fashion, without the
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government middleman, contractual freedom, and thus its ability to lower medical
error rates, will continue to be limited.299
C. Economic Rationale
Just as a systems approach should be taken with respect to the detection, analysis,
and reduction of medical errors, a fundamental reassessment of the healthcare
financing system is urgently needed.300 The market efficiencies of capitalism should
be embraced, rather than restricted, by policy makers. Legislators, patients,
providers, and even lawyers must acknowledge resource limitations, rather than
make unsustainable promises through programs which pass costs along to taxpayers
and succeeding generations.301 Sooner, rather than later, the notion that “you get
what you pay for” must be emphasized. If the system continues to tell patients that
they get what others pay for, it will collapse of its own weight, because those who
are actually paying will lose the incentive to be productive.
As noted earlier, healthcare is not a fundamental right, but most Americans have
health insurance through their job or a government program.302 Others elect to pay
out-of-pocket for insurance or direct costs. Still others freely elect to forgo care or
insurance. The minority of Americans left wanting for care or insurance will benefit
from market solutions. For example, self-employed individuals and small businesses
can form risk pool alliances which allow them to negotiate better insurance rates.303
Florida created just such a program in the Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform
Act of 1993, which established community based health purchasing alliances.304
Another approach is to reconsider the purpose of health insurance, which is to
prevent unpredictable costs.305 Many people can probably afford to trade-off
between a higher deductible in exchange for lower premiums, as is done for home or
auto insurance. Paying directly for certain small incidental costs would encourage
true consumerism, while catastrophic losses would be avoided.
People should not be forced to buy what they don’t want or need, yet that is
exactly what is happening with many current policies through a one size fits all
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approach.306 Why should a fifty year old man have the same plan as a twenty-five
year old woman? Employer sponsored plans could offer a greater menu of choices
for a better custom fit for each employee. This allows employees flexibility to pay
only for what they need or want. What the employee “saves” in benefits could
thereby be realized as increased wages. Ideally, the tax code would equalize
treatment for this variety of individual expenses, but a discussion of how this could
be done is beyond the scope of this article.
The free market, and not the government, is the most efficient solution to
increase access to healthcare, control costs, and improve quality through error
reduction. A free market “gives people what they want instead of what a particular
group thinks they ought to want.”307 As a critical corollary to this notion, the free
market promotes individual responsibility by emphasizing that consumers get what
they actually pay for. Government and the law play an important role in adjusting to
and promoting competition, by enforcing contracts, and preventing fraud and
deception.308 This creates an awareness by consumers, who in turn vote with their
wallets when the market fails to meet their needs. In the recent case of Pegram v.
Hedrich,309 the Supreme Court acknowledged that cost-control measures are
necessary, and are influenced by market forces and negligence risks. Socialized
medicine, on the other hand, will reduce market incentives to lower medical error
rates, because consumer choice will be restricted. The economic incentives to
produce a safer product will be blunted by reduced consumer choice and cost
awareness.
Healthcare should remain a service, and not a right. Businesses who provide the
service of healthcare, whether for profit or not, must still attend to the bottom line.
That bottom line requires them to control costs while still offering a product that
consumers demand. A business must face the threat that a competitor will create a
more desirable product, either because it’s cheaper, safer, or better in other ways.
What the market will bear requires constant vigilance and adaptation by the business
that wishes to remain viable. If what consumers ultimately desire is safer healthcare,
then politicians, lawyers, insurers, and providers should honor that choice as
promoting the essence of our liberties. Medical error rates will then fall as a
necessary predicate for providers’ market survival. The magic of capitalism’s
“invisible hand” will always create a niche for the able entrepreneur.310
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